This paper studies optimal persuasion. A speaker must decide which arguments to present and a listener which arguments to accept. Communication is limited in that the arguments available to the speaker depend on her information. Optimality is assessed from the listener's perspective assuming...

This paper develops a formal approach to evaluating freedom in interactive settings based on the literatures on preference for flexibility and measurement of diversity. The approach posits that freedom has an instrumental component -- grounded in preferences -- and an intrinsic component. The...

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...

I present a model of freedom as control. Control is measured by the preferences of a decision-maker, or judge, who values flexibility and is neutral towards outcomes ex ante. Formally, I explore the consequences of adding a neutrality axiom to the Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) axioms for...