The introduction of renewable energy sources (RES) in an electricity market changes the shape of the system's supply curve. In a perfectly competitive market, this causes a downward pressure on equilibrium prices called the merit order effect (MoE). However, when introducing or transferring RES...

Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are,...

Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...

Dual pricing is a practice through which resource-endowed states sell their energy resources at significantly lower prices on the domestic market, as compared to the price on the export market. Dual pricing could be considered an environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidy: States that maintain...

I show that British electricity tariffs create substantial welfare loss, equivalent to between six and eighteen percent of domestic consumption value. Losses are greater than unpriced distributional and environmental counter effects. Expected technological change will increase this welfare loss....

We estimate the welfare implications of a cost-reflective 'Coasian' reform of electricity network tariffs using an Irish case study. We find that current Distribution Use of System (DUoS) tariffs deviate considerably from a cost-reflective structure. At the individual level, tariff reform leads...