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Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences : envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C. - In: Social choice and welfare 17 (2000) 2, pp. 247-267

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001497835

Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences : envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993203

Subcyclic sets of linear orders

Fishburn, Peter C. - In: Social choice and welfare 24 (2005) 2, pp. 199-210

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003010826

Discount-neutral utility models for denumerable time streams

Fishburn, Peter C. - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 43 (1997) 2, pp. 139-166

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001229035

Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences

Edelman, Paul; Fishburn, Peter C. - In: Mathematical social sciences 41 (2001) 3, pp. 327-347

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001560518

Decision analysis under states-additive SSB preferences

Lavalle, Irving H.; Fishburn, Peter C. - In: Operations research 35 (1987) 5, pp. 722-735

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003548239

The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order : Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn

Pattanaik, P. K.; Brams, Steven J.; Gehrlein, William V.; … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013518406

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - In: Social choice and welfare 41 (2013) 1, pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756604

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - 2009

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810998

Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation

Kilgour, D. Marc - 2009

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they 'fall back' on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157458