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Mixed motives : an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes

Boockmann, Bernhard - 2002

Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one's vote may …In this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour … multinomial logit with country-specific unobserved heteroge-neity, using roll-call votes on the final passage of ILO conventions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447398

Mixed motives : an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes

Boockmann, Bernhard - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428483

Mixed Motives : An Empirical Analysis of Ilo Roll-Call Votes

Boockmann, Bernhard - 2008

Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one's vote may …In this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour … multinomial logit with country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, using roll-call votes on the final passage of ILO conventions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113349

Mixed motives : an empirical analysis

Boockmann, Bernhard - In: Constitutional political economy 14 (2003) 4, pp. 263-285

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001845251

Beyond political divides: analyzing public opinion on carbon taxation in Switzerland

Ott, Laurent; Farsi, Mehdi; Weber, Sylvain - 2020

preferences among various taxation attributes and is followed by a referendum voting experiment on various CO2 levy proposals … redistribution of proceeds across all taxpayers. Findings from the voting experiment point to a general support among the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012319681

The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - 2013

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183375

Empirical Welfare Analysis in Random Utility Models of Labour Supply

Decoster, André; Haan, Peter - 2011

The aim of this paper is to apply recently proposed individual welfare measures in the context of random utility models of labour supply. Contrary to the standard practice of using reference preferences and wages, these measures preserve preference heterogeneity in the normative step of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187330

Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples

Jochen Haake, Claus; Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215597

Binary Mechanism for the Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences

Inoue, Fumiya - 2017

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. In this problem, it is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness requirements. We alternatively propose a simple and natural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950207

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof mechanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219400