This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined "state of the world" with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine...

Why do individuals take different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper investigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis, in...

Bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences. For every bargaining game, however, the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ. We explore the hypothesis that preferences change according...

Keynes (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) have articulated an aversion toward betting on an urn containing balls of two colors of unknown proportion to one with a 50-50 composition. Keynes views this as reflecting different preferences for bets arising from different sources of uncertainty. Ellsberg...

We explore the individual and joint explanatory power of concepts from economics, psychology, and criminology for criminal behavior. More precisely, we consider risk and time preferences, personality traits from psychology (Big Five and locus of control), and a self-control scale from...

To make predictions with theories, usually we assume an individual's characteristics such as uncertainty preferences to be stable over time. In this paper, we analyze the stability of ambiguity preferences experimentally. We repeatedly elicit ambiguity attitudes towards multiple 3-color Ellsberg...