Showing 1 - 10 of 325
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672008
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689320
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771438
We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183375
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by S¨onmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321321
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sonmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733933
We extends the single-crossing property of preferences to tree graphs, and show that it is equivalent to intermediate preferences and order restriction, also extended to tree graphs. Moreover, to facilitate the use of single-crossing in network games, we develop algorithms to answer the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076518
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215597
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003771299
I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517013