Similar Search Results

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence : the boundary problem

Bochet, Olivier (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292891

Implementation and experimental approaches to efficiency and market equilibrium

Bochet, Olivier - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003386768

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem

Bochet, Olivier - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003199031

Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

Klaus, Bettina - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 17 (2001) 3, pp. 675-692

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001574796

Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited

Klaus, Bettina - In: Review of economic design : RED 6 (2001) 1, pp. 85-98

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001575373

Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

Klaus, Bettina - In: Games and economic behavior 34 (2001) 1, pp. 64-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001548596

"Fair marriages" : an impossibility

Klaus, Bettina - In: Economics letters 105 (2009) 1, pp. 74-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003899366

A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

Klaus, Bettina - In: Social choice and welfare 26 (2006) 2, pp. 255-261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003347867

The role of replication-invariance : two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

Klaus, Bettina - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647557

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689320