(n2) algorithm (where n = |A B|) for the popular matching problem in this model. Note that this model is quite different … matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such that the number of vertices that prefer M' to M exceeds the number of … vertices that prefer M to M'. We show that the problem of deciding whether G admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard. This …

-completeness proofs we determinethe complexity of all cases not yet known, and thus give an exact boundary in terms of preference …

This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodatenon-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatiblemechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designedto adequately accommodate a plethora of …

owned. For such problems, when preferences are strict, the “top trading cycles” algorithm provides the only rule that is … efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational Ma (1994). Our contribution is to generalize this algorithm to accommodate …

experiments that demonstrate the reliability and efficiency of the DC-EGM algorithm and the associated maximum likelihood …

In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where individuals meet a … number of dates and learn about their aspirations, followed by a matching phase where individuals are matched according to a … version of Gale and Shapley's (1962) deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using simulations of this model, we study how the …