This paper studies a time-inconsistent dividend problem in discrete time with nonex- ponential discounting. Motivated by the decreasing impatience in behaviour economics, a general discount function is used and assumed to be log sub-additive. Using a game-theoretic approach equilibrium barrier...

Inspired by Strotz's consistent planning strategy, we formulate the infinite horizon mean-variance stopping problem as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in order to determine time consistent strategies with no regret. Equilibria among stopping times or randomized stopping times may not exist....

A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium, is introduced for timeinconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in Time-Consistent Stopping Under Decreasing Impatience and On Finding Equilibrium Stopping Times for...

We consider a Stackelberg game in discrete time where a manager (leader) hires an agent (follower) for the completion of a project. The project has two states: either uncompleted or completed. The manager gets a fixed reward upon the completion of the project. At the beginning of each stage...