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We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490647
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
-symmetric generalizations of each. In addition, we discuss approaches to some of these solutions using the notions of potential and consistency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024490
In the absence of externalities, marginality is equivalent to an independence property that rests on Harsanyi‘s dividends. These dividends identify the surplus inherent to each coalition. Independence states that a player‘s payoff stays the same if only dividends of coalitions to which this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010357
This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024492
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players ́possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532576
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
We study cooperative games with transferable utility and limited cooperation possibilities. The focus is on communication structures where the set of players forms a circle, so that the possibilities of cooperation are represented by the connected sets of nodes of an undirected circular graph....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041728