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An important open problem in the theory of TU-games is to determine whether a game has a stable core (Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (1944)). This seems to be a rather difficult combinatorial problem. There are many sufficient conditions for core-stability. Convexity is probably the best known...
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In this paper, we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games). Moreover, we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex...
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If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of...
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