coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …

We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition … graph and the NT-solution coincides with the average tree solution. We also study core stability of the solutions and show … that both the HS-solution and NT-solution belong to the core under half-space supermodularity, which is a weaker condition …

is the same. We further give weak forms of convexity that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the core stability …

We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has … where the fuzzy game is continuous. Our main result shows that any fuzzy game has a non-empty core if and only if it …

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the Restricted Core for such … players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the Core, and contains the well-known Shapley value … special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this solution to …