The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...

For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept. Convexity can be defined in a number of ways, each having its own specific attractions. Basically, these definitions fall into two categories, namely those based on a...

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first...

We consider the problem of computing the influence of a neuronal structure in a brain network. Abraham, Kotter, Krumnack, and Wanke (2006) computed this influence by using the Shapley value of a coalitional game corresponding to a directed network as a rating. Kotter, Reid, Krumnack, Wanke, and...

In this paper, we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games). Moreover, we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex...