We introduce hierarchical decision-making in a repeated public goods experiment where representatives decide on contributions and punishment not only on their behalf, but also on behalf of their team members. We confirm the established finding that punishment reverses the slide towards the zero...

The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to avoid overharvesting, requires the coordination of national contributions. The contributions are managed by elected governments who, in turn, are subject to public pressure on the matter. In an...

We introduce hierarchical decision-making in a repeated public goods experiment where representatives decide on contributions and punishment not only on their behalf, but also on behalf of their team members. We confirm the established finding that punishment reverses the slide towards the zero...

GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar...

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterising an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the...

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterising an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the...