Similar Search Results

Comparing constitutions : cohesion and distribution in legislatures

Diermeier, Daniel - In: European economic review : EER 42 (1998) 3, pp. 665-672

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001246228

The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting

Parker, Glenn R. - In: Public choice 95 (1998) 1, pp. 117-129

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001238908

The right type of legislator : a theory of taxation and representation

Mattozzi, Andrea; Snowberg, Erik - In: Journal of public economics 159 (2018), pp. 54-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035237

Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Ramer, Roald; Schram, Arthur - In: Games and economic behavior 96 (2016), pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742196

The right type of legislator : a theory of taxation and representation

Mattozzi, Andrea; Snowberg, Erik - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011800108

Who are the ‘ghost’ MPs? : evidence from the French parliament

Gavoille, Nicolas - In: European journal of political economy 53 (2018), pp. 134-148

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011973308

Political actors playing games : theory and experiments

Kamm, Aaron - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444892

Voting power and at-large representation

Edelman, Paul H. - In: Mathematical social sciences 47 (2004) 2, pp. 219-232

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001904166

Modeling the legislator as an agent for the party : the effects of strict party discipline on legislator voting behavior

Longley, Neil - In: Contemporary economic policy : a journal of Western … 21 (2003) 4, pp. 490-499

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001802766

Bargaining in legislatures : a new donation paradox

Montero, María - 2010

It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008738473