This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk averse, voluntary contribution is a decreasing function of average efficiency of depollution technology. If on the contrary, the...

We examine the effect of Knightian uncertainty in a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce free-riding if utility is concave or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in...

We examine the effect of introducing Knightian uncertainty into a simple model of public good provision. We find that uncertainty may reduce the free-rider problem if utility is concave in public goods or there are decreasing returns to scale in the production of public goods. It is possible...

This paper provides a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented by Choquet expected...

В статье раскрываются основные этапы развития теории и практики риск-менеджмента. При этом особое внимание уделено осмыслению понятия «риск» в экономической...

It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure, there exists a unique Pareto payoff profile, and we show...

We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies sonditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard...

In perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and a formulation with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over in a particular...

The main objects below are transferable-utility games in which each agent faces an optimization problem, briefly called production planning, constrained by his resource endowment. Coalitions can pool members's resources. Such production games are here extended to accomodate uncertainty about...