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Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

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The timing and incidence of exploratory drilling on offshore wildcat tracts

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Joint bidding in federal OCS auctions

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Optimal selling strategies for oil gas leases with an informed buyer

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Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

Hendricks, Kenneth; Pinkse, Joris; Porter, Robert H. - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001578413

Bidding rings and the winner's curse : the case of federal offshore oil and gas lese auctions

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Random reservation prices and bidding behavior in OCS drainage auctions

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Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

Hendricks, Kenneth; Pinkse, Joris; Porter, Robert H. - In: The review of economic studies 70 (2003) 1, pp. 115-145

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001725577

Bidding rings and the winner's curse : the case of federal offshore oil and gas lease auctions

Hendricks, Kenneth (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to aliated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government o.shore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that e.cient collusion is always possible in private value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002200407