This study examines three issues related to the sensitivity of bank CEO compensation to risk, or vega: (1) its relevance compared with CEO compensation vega in industrial firms; (2) its determinants; and (3) its effect on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 156 U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs)...

This article examines the interrelations among five ownership and board characteristics in a sample of 260 banks and Savings-and-Loan Holding Companies (SLHCs). These governance characteristics, designed to reduce agency problems between shareholders and managers are insider ownership,...

Theoretical literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Edmans and Liu, 2011) argues that inside debt – pension benefits and deferred compensation – has debt-like payoffs, and can therefore curb executives' excessive risk-taking incentives created by equity holdings. We test this theory in the...