Intergenerational redistribution is one of the major aims of national welfare states that have to prove their reliability in a world of internationally integrated goods and factor markets. In this paper, we analyse the conditions for the existence of steady-state equilibria and the (Pareto-)...

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in...

Intergenerational redistribution is one of the major aims of national welfare states that have to prove their reliability in a world of internationally integrated goods and factor markets. In this paper, we analyse the conditions for the existence of steady-state equilibria and the (Pareto-)...

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered...