In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms which are designed to deal with non-point source pollution : collective fining, random fining, and a tax-subsidy scheme. Our results show that collective and random fining schemes do not induce the...

In this article I survey the theoretical literature on environmental policy in the presence of imperfect competition, ranging from early contributions in the 1960s to the present. I cover the following market structures when polluting firms have market power in the output market: monopoly,...

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adopt new technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms which are subject to regulation. We...

Fisher [2000, this journal] offers a unifying framework for two concepts of (quasi-) option value suggested by Arrow, Fisher, Hanemann, and Henry (AFHH) on the one hand, and by Dixit and Pindyck (DP) on the other, and claims these two concepts to be equivalent. We show that this claim is not...