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The present paper analyzes the impact of a climate coalition's border carbon adjustment on emissions from commodity production, welfare and the coalition size. The coalition implements border carbon adjustment to reduce carbon leakage and to improve its terms of trade, while the fringe abstains...
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This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The symmetric Nash bargaining solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol, whereas in the Paris Agreement coalition countries maximize a country-specific asymmetric Nash product. In the...
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This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013341779
We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes,...
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