This chapiter of a collective book is dedicated to classical decision models under uncertainty, i.e. under situations where events do not have "objective" probabilities with which the Decision Marker agrees. We present successively the two main theories, their axiomatic, the interpretation and...

This chapter of a collective book aims at presenting cardinal extensions of the EU model, based on the Choquet integral, which allow to take into account observed behaviors as in Allais' paradox under risk or Ellsberg's paradox under uncertainty, where the expected utility model is violated....

Victor prefers safety more than Ursula if whenever Ursula prefers a constant to an uncertain act, so does Victor. This paradigm, whose expected utility (EU) version is Arrow and Pratt’s more risk aversion concept, will be studied in the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model. Necessary condition...

This chapter of a collective book aims at presenting cardinal extensions of the EU model, based on the Choquet integral, which allow to take into account observed behaviors as in Allais' paradox under risk or Ellsberg's paradox under uncertainty, where the expected utility model is violated....

This chapiter of a collective book is dedicated to classical decision models under uncertainty, i.e. under situations where events do not have "objective" probabilities with which the Decision Marker agrees. We present successively the two main theories, their axiomatic, the interpretation and...

We provide possibility results on the aggregation of beliefs and tastes for Monotone, Bernoullian and Archimedian preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2011). We propose a new axiom, Unambiguous Pareto Dominance, which requires that if the...

We develop an axiomatic approach to decision under uncertainty that explicitly takes into account the information available to the decision maker. The information is described by a set of priors and a reference prior. We define a notion of imprecision for this informational setting and show that...

We axiomatize in the Anscombe–Aumann setting a wide class of preferences called rank-dependent additive preferences that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty as well as state dependent versions of these models. We prove that aggregation is possible and necessarily linear if...