This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden s social insurance system. There are two main topics of interest: how the sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent...

The paper studies if temporary jobs in the form of fixed-term replacement contracts reduce the risk of future unemployment among job-seekers. Using exact matching on labour market history and personal characteristics we find positive effects of the replacement contract on future labour market...

The paper studies if temporary jobs in the form of fixed-term replacement contracts reduce the risk of future unemployment among job-seekers. Using exact matching on labour market history and personal characteristics we find positive effects of the replacement contract on future labour market...

This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. There are two main topics of interest: how the sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent...