The paper examines how asymmetric information affects the supply of entrepreneurs and the level of unemployment. The model first analyzes the case where banks, when providing credit, are unable to observe entrepreneurs' risk of failure. We find that credit rationing may increase the number of...

We examine how three sources of asymmetric information affect the supply of entrepreneurs and unemployment. In the first case, banks cannot observe entrepreneurs' risk of failure, so they ration credit. This increases the number of entrepreneurs and the level of unemployment. In the second case,...

We examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal nonlinear income tax scheme. In this setting, governments cannot observe household abilities, only their incomes. Redistributing according to income, the government is constrained by a set of incentive constraints....

Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor...