This paper proposes a labor market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and effort. Firms use wage contracts to motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We define and characterize competitive search equilibrium in...

The recent financial crises, alongside a dramatic rise in unemployment on both sides of the Atlantic, suggest that financial shocks do translate into the labor markets. In this paper we first document that financial recessions amplify labor market volatility and Okun's elasticity over the...

The recent financial crises, alongside a dramatic rise in unemployment on both sides of the Atlantic, suggest that financial shocks do translate into the labor markets. In this paper we first document that financial recessions amplify labor market volatility and Okun's elasticity over the...

This paper examines the competitive search equilibrium when the workers' effort choice and type are private information. We derive a modified Hosios rule determining the allocation of resources and analyze how private information influences the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes...

We consider a frictional labor market in which firms want to insure their senior employees against income fluctuations and, at the same time, want to recruit new employees to fill their vacant positions. Firms can commit to a wage schedule, i.e. a schedule that specifies the wage paid by the...