This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an...

This paper analyzes an urn–ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. The model allows for tractable equilibrium characterization with a continuous search intensity margin. Equilibrium is not...

We incorporate a wage bargaining structure in a dynamic general equilibrium model and show how this feature changes short and long-run properties of equilibria compared with a perfectly competitive setting. We discuss how employment, capital, and income shares respond to wage setting shocks and...

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with collective wage bargaining and investigate how unemployment dynamics are affected by two types of budgetary policies. In line with traditional reasoning, a balanced-budget rule amplifies fluctuations in the short run, whereas an...

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with collective wage bargaining and investigate how unemployment dynamics are affected by two types of budgetary policies. In line with traditional reasoning, a balanced-budget rule amplifies fluctuations in the short run, whereas an...

We incorporate a wage bargaining structure in a dynamic general equilibrium model and show how this feature changes short and long-run properties of equilibria compared with a perfectly competitive setting. We discuss how employment, capital, and income shares respond to wage setting shocks and...