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Efficiency wages theories argue that the threat of firing, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to test the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603319
Efficiency wages theories argue that the threat of firing, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to verify the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826213
J41; M51; J45 </AbstractSection> Copyright Scoppa and Vuri; licensee Springer. 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993757
Efficiency wages theories argue that the threat of firing, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to verify the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599176
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001677881
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001954883
In this paper it is shown that by explicitly considering the existence of unemployed trained workers, some of the results shown by Acemoglu and Pischke regarding the effect of unemployment on the firms' training decisions become ambiguous. In fact, two contrasting effects have to be considered:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014115186
Efficiency wages theories argue that the threat of firing, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to verify the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089002
E fficiency wages theories argue that the threat of ring, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to verify the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064781
Efficiency wages theories argue that the threat of firing, coupled with a high unemployment rate, is a mechanism that discourages employee shirking in asymmetric information contexts. Our empirical analysis aims to test the role of unemployment as a worker discipline device, considering the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384373