We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

We use a dynamic model of cash management in which firms face competitive pressure to show that competition increases corporate cash holdings as well as the frequency and size of equity issues. In our model, these effects are driven by small, financially constrained firms, in contrast with the...

We analyze whether the diversification discount is driven by the book value bias of corporate debt. Book values of debt may be a more downward biased proxy of the market value of debt for diversified firms, relative to undiversified firms, as diversification leads to lower firm risk. Thus,...

We consider the investment timing and financing decisions of financially constrained small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in a dynamic setting with asymmetric information. To alleviate its financing constraints, an SME finances a risky project using equity-for-guarantee swaps (EGS), which...

Numerous studies have examined the effect on credit spreads of renegotiation. These studies have generally focussed on the impact on spread levels in general, and not on how renegotiation influences the relative pricing of senior versus junior debt claims. In this paper, we show that the scope...

We analyze the real option signaling game models of debt financing of a risky project under information asymmetry, where the firm quality is only known to the firm management but not outsiders. The firm decides on the optimal investment timing of the risky project that requires upfront fixed...