In this paper, we model network formation and network interactions under a unified framework. The key feature of our model is to allow individuals to respond to incentives that stem from interaction benefits of certain activities when they choose friends (network links), while capturing...

I look at the equilibrium effects of homophily in network formation games having positive externalities. I show that very weak preferences for network effects (such as preference for being part of a clique) may result in very high levels of homophily at equilibrium. I present an empirical...

We model network formation and interactions under a unified framework by considering that individuals anticipate the effect of network structure on the utility of network interactions when choosing links. There are two advantages of this modeling approach: first, we can evaluate whether network...

We survey the recent, fast-growing literature on peer effects in networks. An important recurring theme is that the causal identification of peer effects depends on the structure of the network itself. In the absence of correlated effects, the reflection problem is generally solved by network...

We survey the recent, fast-growing literature on peer effects in networks. An important recurring theme is that the causal identification of peer effects depends on the structure of the network itself. In the absence of correlated effects, the reflection problem is generally solved by network...