We study voluntary disclosure strategies in leader-follower games where firms choose real actions sequentially after simultaneously disclosing information. We show that the leader incurs an endogenous consistency cost when withholding information because it must choose a suboptimal real action...

We develop an economic theory on the endogenous relationship between corporate disclosure and shareholder litigation and derive three key results. (i) Decreasing litigation risk can lead to more or less disclosure due a trade-off between the deterrence and the insurance effects of litigation....

Inhaltsübersicht 1. Einfuhrung und institutionelle Grundlagen 1 2. Wert von Informationssystemen 47 3. Rechnungslegung und Kapitalmarkt 89 4. Bilanzierungs-und Bewertungsgrundsätze 141 5. Ausschüttungsbemessung ...