This paper examines whether and how inside ownership mediates the relation between disclosure quality and the cost of capital. Both ownership and more transparent reporting have the potential to align incentives between managers and investors thereby reducing systematic risk. Employing a large...

This paper examines whether and how inside ownership mediates the relation between disclosure quality and the cost of capital. Both ownership and more transparent reporting have the potential to align incentives between managers and investors thereby reducing systematic risk. Employing a large...

We study how short-term changes in institutional owner attention affect managers' disclosure choices. Holding institutional ownership constant and controlling for industry-quarter effects, we find that managers respond to attention by increasing the number of forecasts and 8-K filings. Rather...

Using the first and recently available universe of dark pool trading in the U.S. from FINRA, we document trading patterns around scheduled and unscheduled corporate information events. We find that there is more trading in dark pools in the week of earnings announcement as well as analyst...

We show that the 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosures from active mutual funds unintendedly increased the profitability of trading by another set of informed investors, namely insiders. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that this increase in insiders' profits is due to mutual...