This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of bidders in contests with endogenous stochastic entry. I study a standard all-pay auction in which bidders' valuations are commonly known but their participation decisions private. Each potential bidder has to incur an entry cost...

We examine the effect of publicly disclosing or concealing bidders' types in an all-pay auction with a common bid cap. We call partial (full) disclosure policy the setup where the contest designer's disclosure policy is (not) contingent on type realization. Despite a bid cap possibly increasing...

This paper investigates whether a contest organizer should disclose private information about bidders' abilities in an all-pay auction. Bidders' abilities are affiliated through an underlying state of the world and are accessible by the contest organizer. The organizer decides whether to...

We study all-pay auctions with private and affiliated binary values. To increase revenue (i.e., expected aggregate bid), the auction organizer can commit ex ante to fully disclosing or concealing bidders’ valuations. We find that full disclosure, as opposed to full concealment, always...