Firm-specific information can affect expected returns if it affects investor uncertainty about risk-factor loadings. We show that a stock's expected return is decreasing in factor-loading uncertainty, controlling for the average level of its factor loading. When loadings are persistent, learning...

We examine the effects of mandating compensation disclosure on executive incentive contracts, earnings management, firm value, and social welfare. We develop a moral hazard model with multiple principal-agent pairs facing an external monitor who allocates resources across firms to verify...

In this paper, we analytically examine firms' joint decisions to affect the informativeness of their key performance indicators (KPIs) and the accessibility of their supplementary disclosures (e.g., MD&A) when it is costly for investors to analyze the latter. We show that while disclosure...

This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high-performing public companies as well as more troubled companies withhold issuing guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of the guidance, but issuing a...

We present a theory of bank disclosure in which banks face both adverse selection and bank run risk. In our model, banks disclose information to reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but information disclosure can also trigger inefficient bank runs. We show that the level of disclosure...

We study how leaks affect a firm's communication decisions and real efficiency. A privately informed manager strategically chooses both public disclosure and internal communication to employees. Public disclosure is noisy, but in the absence of leaks, internal communication is perfectly...

We develop a model of voluntary disclosure in the presence of diversely-informed investors. The manager's disclosure strategy influences trading by investors, which in turn affects the manager's incentives to disclose. We document conditions under which there exists a unique equilibrium where...