We develop a mixed-duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed of market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low,...

Evidence suggests that managers have an incentive to keep information opaque with the market when negotiating with employees who can extract above-market rents from the firm. We argue that employee ownership should mitigate this incentive to extract above-market rents and, in turn, alleviate the...

Evidence suggests that managers have an incentive to keep information opaque with the market when negotiating with employees who can extract above-market rents from the firm. We argue that employee ownership should mitigate this incentive to extract above-market rents and, in turn, alleviate the...

Extant theory claims a firm's information environment impacts the choice between debt and equity financing. However, empirical evidence supporting this contention is limited. We evaluate this relation within the context of Regulation FD (Reg FD) which prohibited the use of selective disclosure....

This study provides international evidence that external financing dependence creates incentives for firms to undertake a higher level of voluntary accounting disclosure. For a sample of 856 observations from 34 countries and 18 different manufacturing industry sectors, we document that firms in...