We investigate if and how revenue-maximizing auctioneers restrict combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. Two sellers offer the same set of two heterogeneous items to six bidders in a VCG mechanism. Each bidder desires either the first item, the second item, or the...

Combinatorial auctions, in particular core-selecting auctions, have increasingly attracted the attention of academics and practitioners. We experimentally analyze core-selecting auctions under incomplete information and find that they perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of...

Combinatorial auctions, in particular core-selecting auctions, have increasingly attracted the attention of academics and practitioners. We experimentally analyze core-selecting auctions under incomplete information and find that they perform better than the Vickrey auction. The proportions of...

We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that of a single auctioneer. Bidders are heterogeneous in...