According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash equilibrium does not optimize any global criterion per se, and so there is no apparent reason why...

The design of route-guidance systems faces a well-known dilemma. The approach that theoretically yields the system-optimal traffic pattern may discriminate against some users, for the sake of favoring others. Proposed alternate models, however, do not directly address the system perspective and...

We consider network games with atomic players, which indicates that some players control a positive amount of flow. Instead of studying Nash equilibria as previous work has done, we consider that players with considerable market power will make decisions before the others because they can...

Heavy and uncertain traffic conditions exacerbate the commuting experience of millions of people across the globe. When planning important trips, commuters typically add an extra buffer to the expected trip duration to ensure on-time arrival. Motivated by this, we propose a new traffic...

Local search algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems are in general of pseudopolynomial running time and polynomial-time algorithms are often not known for finding locally optimal solutions for NP-hard optimization problems. We introduce the concept of epsilon-local optimality and...

Local search algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems are generally of pseudopolynomial running time, and polynomial-time algorithms are not often known for finding locally optimal solutions for NP-hard optimization problems. We introduce the concept of amp;#949;-local optimality and show...