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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191410
Nash (1950) proposes a bargaining theory. This paper proves that Nash’s theory is not about bargaining, but is the result of exchange. Exchange also requires bargaining, but exchange itself is not bargaining
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199938
We consider the long-run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory. We extend the evolutionary bargaining model of Young (1993) to a two-stage Nash demand game. Two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250651
We consider bargaining problems with compact star-shaped choice sets arising from a class of economic bargaining environments. Convex or comprehensive (relative to the disagreement point) problems are star-shaped but not conversely. We characterize single-valued solutions satisfying the Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947706
We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Nash's axioms to determine a unique single-valued bargaining solution up to choices of bargaining powers. Specifically, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030373
Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013488863
This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524731
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316670
We examine a monopolistic supplier's decision about a pure public good when he/she must negotiate with beneficiaries of the good. In our model, while the level of the public good is decided unilaterally by the supplier, the cost share of the public good is negotiated between the supplier and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338329