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An experimental Nash program : a comparison of non-cooperative v.s. cooperative bargaining experiments

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2023

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Nash program by experimentally comparing the results of "structured" (non-cooperative) demand-based and offer-based mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451922

Negotiation across multiple issues

Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140

Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190389

An experiment on the winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2021

In this paper we experimentally compare three implementations of Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012695303

Efficient and Neutral Mechanisms in Almost Ex Ante Bargaining Problems

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2020

I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types---and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854555

A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2017

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971425

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352

Coalition Bargaining in Repeated Games

Polanski, Arnold - 2018

We consider an intertemporal game-theoretic framework in which different coalitions interact repeatedly over time. Both the terms of trade and the endogenous cooperation structure arising in this setup are characterized, in a protocol-free manner, when just three natural conditions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936985

Order Matters : On Maskin's Coalition Formation Bargaining Model

Cao, Zhigang; Yang, Xiaoguang - 2011

We first show through a counter-example that the existence result of Maskin: Bargaining, coalitions and externalities, Presidential address of the Econometric Society, 2003] does not extend beyond three players.Intuitively, the bargaining may not be able to continue because there may be no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176923