Main description: Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value...

We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989a) bargaining model of legislative behavior comparing open versus closed amendment rules. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory as there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the...

We report the results of an experimental investigation of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power, close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily...

Outcomes under the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model are investigated when proposers distribute benefits versus imposing costs under an experimental design where predicted outcomes are theoretically isomorphic, absent reference dependent preferences. Initial experimental sessions showed greater...