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Sequential bargaining, cooperative games, and coalition-proofeness

Moldovanu, Benny - 1990 - Preliminary version

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10000794412

Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game

Chander, Parkash; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - In: Journal of economic theory 187 (2020), pp. 1-26

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012415955

Social Preferences and the Efficiency of Bilateral Exchange

Benjamin, Daniel J. - 2010

Under what conditions do social preferences, such as altruism or a concern for fair outcomes, generate efficient trade? I analyze theoretically a simple bilateral exchange game: Each player sequentially takes an action that reduces his own material payoff but increases the other player’s. Each...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014210036

Do Workers Negotiate Collectively or Separately? An Application of a Coalitional Bargaining Game with Externalities

Kiyotaki, Fumi - 2016

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012996131

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012963352

Supplement to 'Equivalent Conditions for the Existence of an Efficient Equilibrium in Coalitional Bargaining with Externalities and Renegotiations'

Kawamori, Tomohiko - 2017

This supplement provides proofs of all propositions in [Tomohiko Kawamori and Toshiji Miyakawa, "Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations," Operations Research Letters 45(5), 427-430, 2017]

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012953535

Strategic Alliances in Coalitional Bargaining

Lee, Joosung - 2018

, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012922042

Proportional payoffs in majority games

Montero, María (contributor) - 2008

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003675312

Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent; Montero, María - 2012

This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009578191

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011296159