In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...

Teil I Individuelle Entscheidungen: Entscheidung unter Sicherheit -- Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit -- Teil II Kollektive und Strategische Entscheidungen: Wohlfahrtsanalyse und Kollektive Entscheidung -- Märkte -- Spieltheorie - Strategische Entscheidungen -- Bayesianische Spiele --...