When risks are interdependent, loss-prevention activities of one agent influence the risks faced by others. The social return to an investment in loss-prevention is greater than the private return. From a perspective of social welfare, the market allocation is not optimal and leads to...

The present paper analyzes the demand for insurance when the insurer has incomplete information about types of potential customers. We assume that customers' risk preferences cannot be distinguished by the insurer. Therefore, the standard result in insurance economics that the insurer...

This paper makes two contributions to the insurance literature by studying optimal insurance policy indemnity schedules with policyholders' limited liability and background risk. First, generalizing a prominent approach by Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983), it is shown that a welfare subsidy in...

1. Introduction -- 2. Risk and Risk Perception: Why we are not Rational in the Face of Risk -- 3. Expected Utility, Prospect Theory, and the Allais Paradox: Why Reference Points are Important -- 4. Confirmation Bias and Anchoring Effect: Why the First Piece of Information is Key in Negotiations...

Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert die optimale Prämienpolitik eines Versicherers bei stochastischer Verteilung der Nachfragertypen auf Basis einer Preis-Absatz-Funktion. Dem Versicherer ist hier lediglich die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung der individuellen Nachfragertypen bekannt und eine...

This paper studies insurance demand for individuals with limited financial literacy. We propose uncertainty about insurance payouts, resulting from contract complexity, as a novel channel that affects decision-making of financially illiterate individuals. Then, a trade-off between second-order...