The paper's starting point is that EC competition law does not draw any distinction between horizontal and vertical relations when it comes to the definition of the concept of agreement. This approach could make sense if vertical and horizontal agreements were considered as equally harmful to...

This paper considers the incentive for non-price discrimination of a monopolist in an input market who also sells in an oligopoly downstream market through a subsidiary. Such a monopolist can raise the costs of the rivals to its subsidiary though discriminatory quality degradation. I find that...

This paper evaluates the incentive of firms to vertically integrate in a simple 2X2 Bertrand model of two substitutes that are each comprised of two complementary components. It confirms that all prices fall as a result of a vertical merger. Further, we find that, when the composite goods are...

This paper considers the incentive for non-price discrimination of amonopolist in an input market who also sells in an oligopoly downstreammarket through a subsidiary. Such a monopolist can raise the costs ofthe rivals to its subsidiary though discriminatory quality degradation.I find that the...