In a recent paper, Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta (2006) challenge the idea that an incumbent can foreclose efficient entry in the face of scale economies by using exclusive contracts. They claim that inefficient exclusion does not arise when buyers are homogenous firms that compete...

The existing literature on exclusive dealing is extended to take into account that buyers signing exclusive deals are typically competing firms that are differentiated from the perspective of their customers. We show, provided such downstream firms are not too differentiated, exclusive contracts...

This paper explores the ability of an incumbent to use introductory offers to dominate a market in the face of a more efficient rival when network effects rather than scale economies are present. Both in the case of one-sided and two-sided markets, for introductory offers to be profitable when...

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that competitive bottlenecks arise endogenously. In equilibrium,...

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that competitive bottlenecks arise endogenously. In equilibrium,...