Our paper examines whether the well-documented failure of unsophisticated investors to rebalance their portfolios can help to explain the enormous counter-cyclical volatility of aggregate risk compensation in financial markets. To answer this question, we set up a model in which CRRA-utility...

Our paper examines whether the well-documented failure of unsophisticated investors to rebalance their portfolios can help to explain the enormous counter-cyclical volatility of aggregate risk compensation in financial markets. To answer this question, we set up a model in which CRRA-utility...

Our paper examines whether the well-documented failure of unsophisticated investors to rebalance their portfolios can help to explain the enormous counter-cyclical volatility of aggregate risk compensation in financial markets. To answer this question, we set up a model in which CRRA-utility...

We assess the quantitative implications of collateral re-use on leverage, volatility, and welfare within an infinite-horizon asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents. In our model, the ability of agents to reuse frees up collateral that can be used to back more transactions. Re-use thus...

In this paper we examine the quantitative effects of margin regulation on volatility in asset markets. We consider a general equilibrium infinite-horizon economy with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints. There are two assets in the economy which can be used as collateral for...

In this paper we examine the quantitative effects of margin regulation on volatility in asset markets. We consider a general equilibrium infinite-horizon economy with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints. There are two assets in the economy which can be used as collateral for...

In this paper we examine the quantitative effects of margin regulation on volatility in asset markets. We consider a general equilibrium in finite-horizon economy with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints. There are two assets in the economy which can be used as collateral for...