during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters have privately observed preferences …

A set of voters consults experts before voting over two alternatives. Experts observe private signals about the values … of the alternatives and can reveal their information or conceal it, but cannot lie. We examine how disclosure and voting … vary with preference biases, signal precision, and the voting rule. Unanimity rule can lead to greater information …

Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core …, voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces, would thereby exhibit few … that require a different research agenda to bring into focus. Some of our analysis also has implications for voting …

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …

impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This … is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal. …

, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes …

popular two social objective criteria used when evaluating voting mechanisms. For one particular probabilistic model …