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Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221

Voting Power and Voting Blocs

Leech, Dennis; Leech, Robert - 2006

We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that has voting blocs. Our analysis is theoretical, intended to contribute to a theory of positive political science in which social actors are motivated by the pursuit of power as measured by objective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067067

Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions

Leech, Dennis; Leech, Robert - 2013

The constitutions of the Bretton Woods Institutions require decisions to be taken by weighted voting: each member country possesses a number of votes, depending on its quota allocation, all of which must always be cast as a bloc. This leads to a problem of democratic legitimacy since a member's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069914

Condorcet Jury Theorem in a Spatial Model of Elections

Bhattacharya, Sourav - 2018

status quo and a proposed reform, and there is uncertainty about the location of the reform on the policy space. If each … possible location of the reform is on the same side of the status quo, then equilibria are full information equivalent. If … there is uncertainty about whether the reform lies to the left or right of the status quo, then we have multiple equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911569

Multiwinner Approval Voting : An Apportionment Approach

Brams, Steven J. - 2017

We extend approval voting so as to elect multiple candidates, who may be either individuals or members of a political party, in rough proportion to their approval in the electorate. We analyze two divisor methods of apportionment, first proposed by Jefferson and Webster, that iteratively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960207

Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions

Kóczy, László Á. - 2014

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429130

Voting Games with Abstention : A Probabilistic Characterization of Power and a Special Case of Penrose's Limit Theorem

Lindner, Ines - 2006

In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: 'yes' or 'no'. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059533

On Minimum Sum Representations for Weighted Voting Games

Kurz, Sascha - 2013

A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum, where the weights and the quota are restricted to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151225

Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission's recommendation

Biró, Péter; Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs - 2013

In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197548

Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

Brink, René van den; Dimitrov, Dinko; Rusinowska, Agnieszka - 2019

We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057177