In general, analyses of voting power are performed through the notion of a simple voting game (SVG) in which every voter can choose between two options: 'yes' or 'no'. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) introduced the concept of ternary voting games (TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They...

Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the...

L.S. Penrose was the first to propose a measure of voting power (which later came to be known as 'the (absolute) Banzhaf (Bz) index'). His limit theorem - which is implicit in his booklet (1952) and for which he gave no rigorous proof - says that in simple weighted voting games (WVGs), if the...