A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of...

We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the Nitzan-Paroush framework of "unequal competencies" and Ladha's model of "correlated voting by the jurors". We assume that the jurors behave "informatively", that is, they do not make a strategic use of their...

In this chapter we adopt the axiomatic approach in order to find (new) voting procedures to committees that are immune against deviations by coalitions of voters. We shall now describe our approach. Let G be a committee and let A be a finite set of m alternatives, m ⩾ 2. Our problem is to find...