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Social threshold aggregations

Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Chistyakov, Vyacheslav V.; … - In: Social choice and welfare 35 (2010) 4, pp. 627-646

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662119

Voting models in the Arrovian framework

Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Schofield, Norman - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001328681

Categories of arrovian voting schemes

Aleskerov, Fuad T. - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001773191

On the degree of manipulability of multi-valued social choice rules

Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Karabekyan, Daniel; Sanver, M. Remzi; … - In: Homo oeconomicus 28 (2011) 1/2, pp. 205-216

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009241355

An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Karabekyan, Daniel; Sanver, M. Remzi; … - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 431-446

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives. -- manipulability ; positional voting rules ; multiple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505656

On the manipulability of voting rules : the case of 4 and 5 alternatives

Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Karabekyan, Daniel; Sanver, M. Remzi; … - In: Mathematical social sciences 64 (2012) 1, pp. 67-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009655792

A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification

Aleskerov, Fuad T.; Karpov, Alexander - In: Social choice and welfare 40 (2013) 3, pp. 771-786

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009693421